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THE SOVIET PRECEDENT IN CZECHOSLOVAK AND YUGOSLAV AGRICULTURE:
TWO CASE STUDIES OF COMMUNIST ECONOMIC IMITATION*
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and
Lloyd S. Etheredg e
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The subject of this paper is economic imitatio n as practice d in
Eastern Europe after World War II.

By "econom ic imitatio n" we mean

simply the borrowin g of economic policies and institut ions from the
experien ce or"' other countrie s.

The postwar Communi st governm ents of

the East European countrie s borrowed heavily from Soviet experien ce in
setting economic goals and devising the means of achievin g them.

How

ever, initial economic conditio ns in those countrie s dir"'fered , in some
cases widely, from those of the U,S.S.R .

Moreove r, conditio ns varied

substan tially from country to country in Eastern Europe, from the modern
industry of the Czech lands to the backward mountain economie s of
Albania and southern Yugosla via.
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Economi cs Departm ent, and the Univers ity of Pittsbur gh's program
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and criticism s, Professo r Nicolas Spulber, and Professo r Janet
Chapman and other members of a Univers ity of Pittsbur gh siminar
on compara tive communism. Full respons ibility for the paper's
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contents remains with us.
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There· is, therefore 1 some question as to the suitability of the
Soviet experience for imitation in Eastern Europe.

The common Western

view is that it was highly unsuitable. but that nevertheless the East
European Communists imitated it closely.

One writer has characterized

the results as "pure roast-pig" imitations of the U.S.S.R.:

the East

European countries simple-mindedly adopted the Soviet precedent,
thereby burning down whole cottages just to roast piglets. 1
In this paper we explore the roast-pig hypothesis in detailed
case studies of a single sector, agriculture, in two countries,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. 2 To what extent were Soviet agricultural
policies and institutions lifted wholesale and set in place in these
twq countries, regardless of the cost?

What attempts. if any, were

made to tailor the borrowings to local conditions - - i.e. •

11

to discover

what parts of the process to imitate without having to burn down a
whole cottage? 113 If the imitations prove to have been "roast-pig,"
what were the possible rationales and the attendant costs?

Finally,

were there any differences between the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav
imitations of the Soviet Union in agriculture, and if so, why did they
arise, and was one imitation more roast-pig than the other?

Our

findings suggest that, while the roast-pig hypothesis may be valid at
a general level of discussion, it can be overly simple for specific
sectors and countries.
The first step in what follows is to develop a framework for
analyzing Communist economic imitation (section I).

Next, the Soviet

precedent in agriculture is briefly reviewed (section II).

We then

combine the first two sections with a discussion of initial conditions
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in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to deduce some hypotheses about the
two cases as imitations of the Soviet agricultural precedent (section III).
These hypotheses form the basis of the case studies proper:

the postwar

redistributive land reforms in both countries (section IV); the Yugoslav
collectivization and its successor policy (section V); and the
Czechoslovak collectivization (section VI).
tains a summary and the conclusions.

Finally, section VII con
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A Framework for Studying Communist Economic Imitation in Eastern

Europe
A given case of economic imitation can be viewed as the outcome

of two sets of variables:

(1) the previous experience (or precedent)

imitated; and (2) the initial conditions (or antecedents) of the
imitating country, into which the precedent must be introduced.

The

influence of the imitating country's antecedents is likely to cause
the imitation to depart in some degree from an exact replica of the
precedent.

Similarly) different antecedents are likely to give rise to

differences between two imitations of the same precedent.

In fact,

substantial differences may be necessary if economic imitations are to
make economic sense; slavish replication of policies and institutions
without regard to local conditions could prove economically costly.
We shall employ a "rationalist" paradigm of Communist decision
making in developing hypotheses about Czechoslovak and Yugoslav
imitations of Soviet agricultural policy. 4

In this paradigm, Communist

leaders make economic decisions on the basis of costs and returns,
defined to include political as well as economic variables.

In setting

goals, the leaders articulate values or preferences -- for example, by
choosing the variables to go into an "objective function" and assigning
relative weights to them.

The leaders perceive the attainment of goals

as constrained by the antecedents (for instance, the existing factor
endowments, economic institutions, political traditions, and so on).
Their task is to choose policies and institutions that will best achieve
the goals, i.e., maximize the objective function subject to the constraints.
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In carrying out this task, the leaders can choose original
programs, imitative programs, or a blend of the two.

Tneir choice

will depend on the expected relative efficiency of the alternatives,
measured in terms of the degree of achievement of goals within the
constraints.

Decision makers will tend to perceive imitation as more

efficient than an original program, the more similar are their goals
and antecedents to those which prevailed in the prospective precedent;
and conversely. 5 Recall that II efficiency 11 here has two dimensions,
economic and political, which may be either complementary or competitive;
i.e., the pursuit of political goals may either further economic ends
or detract from them.
Once imitation is chosen, decisions must be made on when to begin
introducing the precedent, how rapidly to set it up1 in ~hat sequence
to introduce the various components, and what modifications if any to
make as time passes.

Plausible hypotheses about these decisions might

include the following.
Imitation will tend to begin sooner and proceed faster, the more
urgently the imitating leaders view the attainment of their goals; the
advantages of hindsight will tend to work in the same direction.

On

the other hand, differences in antecedents will raise the returns to
careful preparation and execution of the imitation, thus tending to cause
the imit~tion to begin later and proceed more slowly.
The sequence of an imitation will depend on the relative priorities
of the various goals, subject to constraints such as the supply of
decision making and managerial skills, the existing interindustry
structure of the economy, and foreign exchange earning capacity.

For
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example, a poor agrarian country may want to concentrate on industry
first, neglecting agriculture; but such a country will have less freedom
to adopt this strategy than a wealthier, more industrial country because
of the greater dependence of the economy on agriculture.
An imitation may be modified in course of time for several reasons.
First, the precedent itself may have included changes over time.
Second,the imitation may turn out to be less efficient than expected;
in the extreme case, the imitation will be abandoned.

Finally, if an

imitation is successful, the initial antecedents will gradually be
replaced by new conditions -- and not necessarily in the same manner as
in the precedent.

If so, continued success of the policy will call for

departures from the original precedent at that point.
Within the above framework, it is possible to define "roast-pig"
explicitly as follows:
1.

An imitation would be "roast-pig" if an original program

or an alternative precedent would have produced better results in
terms of the decision makers' effective goals.
2.

If there is a tradeoff between one set of goals and

another -- for example) if political goals conflict with economic
goals -- making decisions in favor of one set of goals would imply
relative "roast-piggery 11 in terms of the other set. 6
3.

Whether goals are complementary or conflicting, a judgment

of "roast-pig" would apply to beginning an imitation too soon, before
proper preparations had been completed; to introducing the precedent too
rapidly; to introducing the components of the precedent in the wrong
order (given the imitator's antecedents); and to not making the appropriate
changes at the proper time(s).
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II.

The Soviet Agricultural Precedent 7
The basis of the Soviet precedent in agriculture was the "collecti

vization" of production.

Collectivization was begun in 1929. simultane

ously with the beginnings of the rapid build-up of heavy industry that
became the hallmark of Soviet growth strategy.

The year 1929 was an

important turning point for Soviet leaders. marking the end of more than
a decade of struggle for political survival under "War Communism" and
tactical consolidation under t:ne "New Economic Policy" (N.E.P.). 8
The dominant goal in the Soviets' choice of an agricultural program
was the rapid growth of heavy industry, to be financed internally (under
the slogan of "socialism-in-one- country").

Another important goal .was

the establishment of a centrally planned economy and a socialist society:
the Soviet state would own virtually all non-labor factor inputs and
closely supervise the production and distribution of goods and services.
Governing all policy choices, of course, was the goal of maintaining
and enhancing the political power of the Soviet government.
The predominant antecedent of Soviet agricultural policies -- and
an important factor in overall economic and social policy -- was the
high proportion of national resources employed in agricultural production
on private peasant smallholds at low factor productivities.

This meant

that the achievement of rapidt internally financed industrial growth
depended crucially on a sizeable contribution from agriculture to industry~
The specific form of this contribution and the institutional means of
obtaining it were conditioned in the Soviet case by the government's
decision to develop industry first and only later worry about agricultural
growth; 10 and by the perception in Moscow that private-peasant agriculture
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could not be relied on either to increase output substantially or to
market any increases on terms which the regime, given its ambitions for
industry, could afford. 11
a

II

Thus the Soviet leaders sought both to extract

tribute" :from agriculture -- in the form of expanded deliveries of

food and raw materials on terms highly favorable to industry, concurrently

with a large net outflow of labor from rural to urban areas -- and to
·,"modernize" agricultural production methods in order to improve the
productivity of the remaining inputs.
In devising their agricultural policies, Soviet leaders could look
to the precedent of their tsarist forbears:

forced procurements of

grain\ for export, and Stolypin's program of favoring the market-oriented.
12
peasant.s and shunting the rest into the industrial labor force.
There
were, however, no proven socialist precedents from which they could borrow.
During the N.E.P. period, several socialist forms had been tried:
variants of producers' co-operative (the TOZ, or

11

two

Association for the

Joint Cultivation of Land," with co-operative cultivation but individual
input ownership, and the artel 1

,

with common ownership of inputs as well

as joint cultivation); the full-fledged agricultural commune; and the
state farm, which relied on hired labor.

By 1929, however, none of these

forms had progressed bByond the experimental stage.
Compulsory mass collectivization, supplemented by a small number
of "state farms," was finally chosen as the institutional basis of the
Soviet agricultural program.

The

11

collective farm" (kolkhoz), a pro

ducer co-operative patterned after the earlier artel', was to be the
main instrument of extracting the "tributen from agriculture and the
main vehicle for transforming peasant smallhold production with mechanized,
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large-scale techniques; in addition, the 1rnlkhoz would serve as a means
for establishing socialist institutions among the peasants.

Tne modern

agricultural techniques were to be introduced under the supervision of
"machine-tractor stations" (MTS), which owned or controlled virtuall.y
all agricultural machinery and supplies of fertilizers and other inputs.
The state farms (sovkhozy) were intended to be large
for bringing marginal

11

11

grain factories 11

new lands 11 into modern, large-scale grain

production.
In order to extract the tribute from agriculture, the Soviet leaders
thought it necessary to reduce the peasants 1 discretion over sowing,
harvesting and marketing decisions.

Collectivization, together with

the state agricultural procurement network, served this end as follows:
(l) Most privately-owned productive assets were expropriated without
compensation at the time a kolkhoz was formed.

(2) The collectives

were held legally responsible for meeting del.ivery quotas to state
procurement agencies. 13 ( 3) The prices paid by the state for quota
deliveries were confiscatory; the somewhat higher prices for above
quota deliveries were not generous and in many cases were still below
average (explicit) cost.

(4) The MTS played important supplementary

roles in procurement (through stiff charges in kind for machinery
services) and in establishing central control over crop patterns
(through the terms of machine-service contracts).

(5) Work for the

collective was compensated according to standardized

1
'

labor-days, 11 the

value of which was determined as a residuum after all obligations in
kind were met and all cash outlays, taxes, mandatory reserves, and 11 civic
cultural11 expenditures were covered by collective farm revenues. 14
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The labor-day method of remunerating collective work-' together
with the fixed quotas and procurement prices; made collectivized peasants
residual claimants to agricultural income.

Hence the peasantry, not the

state 1 was the main bearer of risk in collective agriculture.

Under

these circumstances, it was not difficult to convince peasants
particularly the younger) more productive ones -- to leave the farm
for jobs in industry and transport.

As a result, the Soviet agricultural

labor force declined steadily in numbers (except during World War II)
after 1930. 15
Collectivization

P~E

~~

was a drastic set of measures, but yet

more drastic was the manner in which it was implemented.

Tne First

Eive-Year Plan (1928-1932) envisioned a gradual, deliberate process,
call.ing for- 13·percent of peasant households to be in collectives by
the end of 1932. 16
was frantic:

In contrast, the actual pace of collectivization

That same proportion reportedly rose from 8 percent on

October 1 1 1929, to nearly 60 percent by March 10, 1930 -- a headlong
plunge even if the reports e.xaggeratect the true figures.

Following a

retrenchment to 22 percent in October 1930, the proportion rose again
to 53 percent on July l, 1931, and to 78 percent by the end of 1932.
In 1940 the figure reached nearly 97 percent of all peasant families,
accounting for 99.9 percent of sown area (within pre-1939 borders). 17
The .frantic speed. at which col~_ectivization was implemented con
clusively ended the conciliatory "peasant-worker alliance" of the N.E.P.
period.

Combined with the lack of compensation for peasants' land and

capital and the still weak administrative capacity of Moscow in the
countryside, it produced chaos in Soviet agriculture.

Several million
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peasants died and many more were deported to Siberia; in addition, there
18
were huge losses of livestock.
Not surprisingly, both output and
marketings of agricultural products declined severely during the early
1930 1 s.
The drastic shift in the tactics of collectivization was part of
a broader chain of events in which an awareness of the hard realities
of actual production possibilities gradually replaced the euphoria of
the opening stages of the First Five-Year Plan.

In the resulting

reassessment of priorities, agriculture and certain other sectors
were downgraded.

The reflection of this in agricultural policy was a

de-emphasis of modernizing agricultural technique and increased stress
on extracting a tribute for industrial growth. 19
Soviet collectivized. agriculture recovered from its inauspicious
beginnings to the extent of regaining prior output levels and exceeding
prior marketings levels by the eve of World War II; and by 1952 recovery
from the wartime decline had been achieved. 20 Thus the collective farm
and its supporting institutions were a viable basis of Soviet agricultural
policy at least until the early 1950's.

Since then, although the

collective farms have remained an important feature of Soviet agriculture,
their role has both diminished and altered in emphasis.

Following

Stalin's death in 1953, the state farms (sovkhozy) grew rapidly while
the collectives declined -- in number, total sown area, and shares of
output and factor inputs. 21 At the same time, the emphasis of collective
farm policy was shifted away from extracting a
output and productivity.

11

tribute 11 towards raising

For example, collective farmers' incomes have

risen, compensation for collective work is now specified ex ante, the
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rate of labor migration out or agricultu re has slowed considera bly,
22
and increasing amounts of investmen t have flowed. into agricultu re.
By 1958, the collective farm sect,')r was judged financiall y strong
enough -- and the procureme nt and political problems sufficien tly under
control -- to permit the dissolutio n of the machine-t ractor stations and
the sale of their equipment to the coLLectiv es.

The implied shift in

the role of agricultu re in Soviet economic policy is not surprising in
view of the drama.tic increase in the share of national income originatin g
in industry and other non-agric ultural sectors since 1930.
Western assessmen ts of the contributi on of collectivi zed agricultu re
to Soviet growth vary from substanti al to on:.I..y modest at best.

Those in

the former category tend to emphasize the success of Soviet leaders in
extracting a tribute from agricultu re, while in the latter category the
emphasis tends to be on the poor performan ce of Soviet agricu:itu re in
23 Of more concern to us here is how
raising output and productiv ity.
East European Communist leaders perceived the Soviet precedent and its
implicatio ns in the 1940 1 s.

Tney were no doubt aware of the impressiv e

strides made by Soviet industry during the 1930's, and of the staying
capacity of the economy evidenced during the war.

They must a:.I..so have

been aware of the important non-econom ic achieveme nt of estab:.I..ish ing
a base of socialist institutio ns among the peasants in the vast Soviet
countrysid e.

However, these attraction s of the Soviet agricultu ral

precedent were tempered by the high costs which accompani ed it, particu.
larly the economic disruption caused by the way collectiv ization was
introduced , and the political hostility toward the regime aroused in
the peasantry .

On balance, therefore , the Soviet socialist precedent
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the only one operational at the time -- must have been appealing to the
new Communist rulers of Eastern Europe at the end of World War II,
provided that its worst excesses were avoided.

III.

Some Hypotheses about Economic Imitation in Czechoslovak. and
Yugoslav Agriculture
In this section> we first outline the goals and antecedents wnich

provided the settings for Czechos:i.ovak. and Yugoslav agricultural policies.
With this back.ground, we then advance some hypotheses about imitations
of the Soviet precedent in agriculture in the two countries.

A.

Goals and Antecedents
A number of common goals, borrowed in large part from the

Soviet Communists, shaped the main postwar economic and sociai policies
of both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
gave top priority to industry:

The leaders of both countries

in Czechoslova·Kia, this meant more

emphasis on heavy industry and a reorientation of exports towards
Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.; in Yugoslavia., it meant rapid industri
alization with an emphasis on heavy industry.

Both groups preferred

state ownership of the means of production and central, command planning.
Their common social goal was to destroy the old "bourgeois-capitalist"
order and replace it with "socialism," in the countryside as wel:J. as in
the cities.

Finally, both groups sought to maintain and enhance the

power of their governments and hence a:i.so of the Communist Party.
These general goa:i.s ., along with other 1 more specific ones. were
shaped by a number of political antecedents.
had a strong political base in both countries.

First., the Communist Party
Although the Yugoslav

party was much stronger in the countryside than the Czechoslovak. party,

24

the latter made a determined and not unsuccessful effort to attract rural
support in the early postwar years when the party was still operating
within a parliamentary framework.. 25
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Second, at the end of World War II the Soviet Union held a commanding
position throughout Eastern Europe, a position which Moscow used to
become closely involved in the internal politics of the various countries
in the region.

In economic affairs, the Soviet involvement meant pressure

on the postwar governments of Eastern Europe to espouse Soviet-style
socialism and central planning.

In addition, the goal of rapid industrial

growth assumed the specific forms of emphasis on heavy industry and (at
26
least initially) greater autar·ky, after the Soviet pattern.
The Soviet political presence in Eastern Europe 1,vas reflected
internationa lly in the

11

Cold War," which crystallized into its basic

In that year the United States began Marshall Plan aid
to Western Europe; 27 the 11 Big Three" Western powers united their portions
forms in 1948.

of the German Occupation Zone, and moved to integrate the area by
introducing a common currency and delegating considerable political
authority to German representativ es; and the Russians imposed the Berlin
blockade.

Further events or~ 1948 directly involved the two countries

under study here:

in February the Communist Party assumed full control

in Prague, at Moscow's direction; and in June Yugoslavia was expelled
from the Cominform, the internationa l association of Communist parties,
28 While the exiling
in an attempt to topple Marshal Tito from power.
of the Yugoslavs from the socialist brotherhood did not accomplish its
major objective, the removal of Tito, it nevertheless had a substantial
impact on both Yugoslav and Czechoslovak policy choices) as we show
below.
Turning to economic antecedents, the tvw countries had a number
in common.

First, at the end of the war agricultural production in
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both countries was largely organized in private peasant smallhold s;
the proportion of agricultu ral land remaining in holdings larger than
29 Second,
20 hectares was approxima tely a quarter in both countries .
agricultu ral marketing co-operat ives were widesprea d in both countries
prior to World War II; in Czechoslo vakia, these co-ops were important

channels of governmen t infiuence over agricultu re in the interwar period
30
and during the war.

Third, both countries suffered heavy losses of

population and material inputs during the war; in addition, in both
cases postwar expulsion s of enemy nationa:i..s resu:i..ted in the depopulat ion
31
of large agricultura :i.. land areas.
The major difference s in economic anteceden ts between Czechoslo 
vakia and Yugoslavi a were the degree of industria iization and the
prospects !'or !'urther industria l growth.

On the •-:me hand, Czechos.Lo -

a

vakta had/sizea ble modern industria i sector, a relatively advanced
agricu:i..tura:i.. sector, and the highest per ca.pita income in Eastern
Europe -- potential ly a good base from which to achieve further industri_ . t·ion. 32 A potentia:i.. obstacle to industria l growth was the labor
a11za
!'orce:

Given the wartime manpower losses) realizatio n of the ambitious

plans for industry rested on achieving substanti al increases in agri
cultural productiv ity.
Tne Yugoslav economy, on the other hand) consisted mainly of a
backward agricultu ral sector, with only a modest industria l base (con
centrated in Slovenia and Croatia); as a result, per capita income was
among the lowest in Eastern Europe.

H,::;nce, given the

11

smal:i.. 11 size of

the Yugoslav economy, the possibili ty of generating sufficien t savings
to support rapid industria lization turned on achieving substanti al
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productivity increases in agriculture and/or obtaining substantial out
side aid.

While rural overpopulatio n made it possible to transfer workers

out of agriculture with little loss of output) it presented potentially
serious social problems until industrial expansion could provide adequate
33
off-farm jobs.
Thus, while Czechoslovak ia and. Yugoslavia shared most politic al
and several economic antecedents, they differed widely in the degree of
industrializa tion and the outlook. for achieving further industrial
growth.

This difference placed Yugoslav antecedents much closer than

Czechoslovak. to the conditions which faced Soviet leaders in 1929.

B.

Hypotheses about Imitations of the Soviet Agricultural
Precedent under Czechoslova·K and Yugoslav Conditions

The questions before us are these:

(l) Given the above goals and

antecedents) what agricultural programs would we expect) on~ priori
grounds, to have been adopted in postwar Czechosl,')vak .ia and Yugoslavia?
(2) If we predict an imitative program, which precedent would we expect
to have been imitated?
been implemented?

(3) In what manner would the imitation have

Particularly

how would we expect the precedent to

have been adapted to local conditions?

Alternativel y, what departures

11
r"'rom the precedent would. have been necessary to avoid nroast-pig

consequences ?
In answer to the first two question:s, both Czechoslovak ia and
Yugoslavia would have favored an imitation of Soviet collectiviza tion
as the long-range agricultural program 3 foliowing recovery from the,
war and political consolidatio n of the new regimes.

Three main factors

-J.8-

support this expectation:

(a) the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe 1

together with the Soviet insistence on institutional forms as an index
of politic al reliability; ( b) the ideologies and g•')als of the Communist
leaders of the two countries; and (c) the lack of any other operational,
planned 1 socialist economy to serve as an alternative precedent.

34

As

regards the third question 7 however 1 there are grounds for expecting the
Czechoslovak and Yugoslav imitations to have departed in certain respects
from the Soviet precedent, and in addition to have differed from each
other.
Under Yugoslav conditions, most aspects of the Soviet collectivi
zation -- excluding of course the excesses of its implementation -would have appealed to policy makers.

Because the success of the

industrialization program depended so heavLLy on agriculture, and because
collectivization dovetailed with the goal of establishing ''all-embracing
administrative control over the economy,n 35 we would expect the Yugoslav
Communists to have begun the imitation soon after securing political
control (which they did very shortly after the war's end) and to have
attempted a speedy (though not frantic) implementation.

In other words,

the sooner Bel.grade could begin extracting a "tribute 11 from and moderni
zing production techniques in agriculture, the better.

As for the form

of the tribute, we would expect Yugoslavia to have stressed transfers
of outputs -- at prices advantageous to the industrial sector -- over
the release of factor inputs, since the availability of cheap but
industrially unskilled labor was not a constraint on Yugoslav industriali
critical mass" of investment could
36
have been surmounted with outside (Soviet) aid.
zation.

The hurdJ..e of generating a

11

In Yugoslav circumstances 1 then, the political and economic incen
tives to imitate Soviet experience were complementary.

If., with time,

those circumstances changed so as to encourage (and permit) alterations
in the agricultural program, we would expect the replacement to have
retained much of the essence if not the form of the Soviet precedent;
that is, any replacement of Soviet-style forms in agriculture would
still have tended to serve the joint purposes of obtaining an agricultural
tribute to support industrial growth and. modernizing agricultural
technique.

In short> a Yugoslav imitation of the Soviet agricultural

model would appear, on a priori grounds, to have been an unlikely candi
date for

11

roast-piggery. 11

In Czechoslovakia, the economic attraction of Soviet-style collecti
vization would. have been substantially less than in Yugoslavia.

The

main economic arguments for collectivizing Czechoslovak agriculture
would have been to assist in establishing central control as part of
overall central planning, and to provide a vehicle for upgrading agri
cultural technique and obtaining the alleged benefits (beloved by

37
Marxists in the Soviet tradition) of farms with very large land areas.
However, the already large size of the industrial sector in relation to
agriculture would have weakened both the need for and the possibility
of extracting a significant tribute from agriculture.

The more important

component of any Czechoslovak agricultural tribute would have been labor
inputs rather than (as in Yugoslavia) outputs; however, the absence of
rural overpopulation would have tended to raise the cost of compensating
for the labor outflow with industrially made inputs.
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On economic grounds , therefor e, we would expect to find a selectiv e
imitatio n by the Czechos lovaks of the Soviet precede nt in agricult ure.
There would have been less economic pressure than in Yugosla via for an
early beginnin g or a rapid impleme ntation of the imitatio n; in fact, the
in order to avoid the impleme ntation

pressure s in the opposite directio n,

costs incurred in the Soviet Union, would have been greater in Czecho
slovakia .

Similar ly, we would expect to find less reliance on the instru

ments used by the Soviets to make peasants the major risk bearers in
agricul tural product ion; rather) the use of positive incentiv es and
re~ards to stimula te product ivity would seem better suited to Czechos lo
vak conditio ns than coercion and penaltie s.

Finally, any imitatio n of

the Soviet agricul tural model in Czechos lovakia, to be economi cally
success ful, would have required substan tial deviatio ns from the moctel as
time passed.
If the Czechos lovak imitatio n failed to exhibit the above charact er
istics, we would have to turn for an explana tion to politica l conside ra
tions (system atic error being ruled out by our paradigm ).

In contras t

to the Yugoslav case, in Czechos lovakia politica l factors -- which were,
if anything , a stronge r inducem ent to imitate the Soviet Union than in
Yugosla via -- were competi tive with economic factors.

Tnus, to the extent

Czechos lovak agricul tural policy closely replicat ed Soviet experien ce,
it would have run the r_isk of being

11

roast-pi g."

Whether it in fact

merits the label would depend on the size of the economic costs, if any,
incurred in pursuing the politica l ends.

Note that the very anteced ents

which we have argued would have reduced the economic appeal to Czechos lo
vak leaders of copying the Soviet agricul tural program , would also have
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reduced the economic costs of political ly inspired imitation .

In other

words, to the extent that over all Czechoslov aK economic performan ce was
relatively insensitiv e to wnat happened in agricultur e) the prospects for
roast-pigg ery were reduced.
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IV.

The Postwar Land Reforms, 1945-1948
In the period immediately following World War II, both the Czecho

slovak and Yugoslav governments worked to consolidate their power, repair
In broad terms, then,

war damage, and lay the grounctwor·K for the future.

this period resembled the era of the "New Economic Policy" in the Soviet
Union.

A primary difference from the N.E.P. was the greater ability of

the new regimes to orient temporary, tactica~ measures to longer range,
strategic goals.

This flexibility derived in part from greater certainty

about what those goals were, in part from advance knowledge of the Soviet
precedent.

In addition, both the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav governments

had much firmer administrativ e grips on the countryside than had the
They were therefore able to implement their

early Bolshevik government.

agrarian programs in a more orderly and deliberate manner 1 and sooner
after taking power.
The main thrust of both the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav agricultural
programs in the years 1945-1948 was land reform.

Under the slogan,

"The land belongs to those who till it, 11 both governments enacted land
reform laws in the summer of 1945.
land funds from two sources:

These laws expropriated and reassigned

the entire holdings of nationals of the

wartime enemy countries, collaborator s, and other

11

enemies of the people; 11

and land from the holdings

or

excess of certain limits,

Although the amounts of land affected and the

private citizens and institutions in

reassignment patterns differed, in essence the two countriesr agricultural
policies in the 1945-1948 period were quite similar.

Moreover, ingredients

of longer-term agricultural programs were clearly discernible in both
cases. 38
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A.

The Yugoslav Land Reform
Tne results of the 1945 Yugoslav Law on Agrarian Reform and

Colonization are shown in Table 1. 39

Of the approximately 1.6 million

hectares appropriated, some l million were agricultural land (about

7.5 percent of total agricultural land) 1 and the rest was forest. 40
Most of the land fund lay in the Pannonian Plain (Slavonia and the
41
Vojvodina), where the most fertile soils in Yugoslavia are located.
The small amount of land affected by restricting the maximum size of
holding (lines 4-6 in Table l) reflects the effectiveness of the inter
war land reform in breaking up the large estates inherited from Greater
Hungary after World War I.

Still, the later reform completed the work

of the earlier one, and in addition it helped establish the authority of
the new, Communist government over all land rights.

It also served the

ideological goal of making hired labor unprofitable because of the small
maximum size of individual plots; however, pursuit of this goal was not
without economic cost, as we discuss below.
About half of the land r,und created by the 1945 land reform was
distributed to private peasants (see Table 2).

As shown in Table 3,

however, an individual acquisition was on the average very small, barely
42
Thus one result of the 1945 Yugoslav reform
in the subsistence range.
was to continue the process of fragmentation of private farm holdings
43 Tne possible motives behind
which had been going on since the 1920 1 s.
this result merit further attention.
In the short run, the 1945 reform probably eased the poverty of
some Yugoslav families (over 300,000 of whom received some land -
see Table 3) and helped to build support for the Communist government
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TABLE 1
POSTWAR YUGOSLAV LAL"'ifD REFORM:

AREAS EXPROPRIATED UNDER THE nLAW ON AGRARIAN REFORM AND COLONIZATION,"
AUGUST 23, 1945
Holdings of ex--enemy nationals 3
collaborators and
11
enemies of the people';:

Thousands
of Hectares
affected

Percentage
of total
exEro:eriations

1.

German nationals

637

40.7

2.

Other foreigners

15

0.9

3.

Collaborators and
.ienemies of the people':

92

5.8

-...

Private Holdings of Yugoslavs:

4.

6.

Large estates(> 45 ha.)

235

Peasant holdings over the
legal maxima !}.I

122

Non-cultivators (> 3·-5 ha.)

109

7.8

Institutional Holdings(> 10 ha.):

7.

Banks and corporations

8.

Churches, monasteries, etc.

78

5.0

164

10.5

Missing persons~ settlers'
abandoned holdings

78

5.0

State lands, nLand Communi
tiesn, and confiscations
under the "Law on Revision
of Land Apportionment 11 'E./

36

2.3

TOTALS 1,566

100.0

Other holdings:
9-

10.

Source:

Statisticki godisnjak FNRJ 1955 (Statistical Annual of the
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia) (Beograd: Sa vezni
zavod za statistiku, 1955), p. 109; hereafter cited as Stat.
~ + title year.

> 25-35 ha. of arable land, or 45 ha. of agricultural land,
depending upon soil fertility and the proportion of pasture land.
(Hamilton, p. 172).

El

The last item was a reallocation of land allotted for colonization
in Macedonia and the Kosmet prior to April 6, 1941.

TABLE 2

REASSIGNMENT OF THE LAND FUND CREATED BY THE

1945 YUGOSLAV LAND REFORM
Thousand s
of
hectares

Recipie nts of Land

Percenta ge of
the total
land fund a/

State Institut ions:
1.

State farms

2.

Other state enterpr ises
and institut ions

3.

Forestry program s

General Agricul tural Coopera tives
Individu al Peasant Holdings
TOTALS
Source:
a/

288

18.3

60

3.8

380

24.3

41

2.6

797

51.0

1~566

100.0

See Table 1,
The total of 1,566 thousand hectares includes roughly
half a million hectares of forests.
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TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF LAND TO INDIVIDUAL PEASANT FAMILIES
UNDER THE 1945 WGOSLAV LAND REFORM

(1)

(3)

(2)

Average Acqui
sition, ha./
family

Families

Approximate
Total ha.

(000)

(000) d/

2.04

10.1

144

1.50

180.0

270

Colonists from the same
Republic:

4.32

23.2

100

Colonists from other
Republics:

5.65

42.6

240

Category of Peasant
Family
Local (non-coloni sts):
Landless

2.4 b/

TOTALS
Sources:

316.4 £I

754

Bombelles, p. 22; Jugoslavija 1945-1964: statistibki pregled
(Yugoslavia 1945-1964: Statistical Survey) (Beograd: Savezni Zavod za
Statistiku, 1965), p. 109 (hereafter cited as Jugoslavija 1945-

1964).
Presumably peasants with

11

dwarfi1 holdings ( < 2 ha.).

Average.
Column elements do not sum to total because of rounding.
Column (3) was derived by the authors; the total does not
account for all land distributed to peasants (see Table 2).
If we use Spulber's figure of 2.5 ha. for the average
acquisition 5 the total is 791 thousand hectares, only 6
thousand off the actual figure (Spulber 1957, p. 239.)
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in the country side while more urgent measure s (e.g., the nationa lization
of industry ) were being impleme nted.

Further, the re-settl ing of

depopul ated areas (some of the richest farm land in the country) with
colonis ts from other areas was undoubt edly aimed at the quick restora
tion of output on those lands, since Yugosla via faced a severe threat •f
mass starvati on in 1945 and 1946. Fulfillm ent of this aim was hampere t,
however , by the small size of the allotme nts and a dearth of equipme nt
44 Tne difficu lties were compounded by the unsuita ble
and livestoc k.
backgrou nds of the colonis ts, most of whom came from the poorer regions
of Bosna-H ercegovi na, Southern Serbia, Macedon ia, the Croatian Karst and
Montene gro, and laaked experien ce with, knew only backward techniqu es f~r,
or positive ly disliked crop cultivat ion.

45

Beyond serving short run goals, however , the 1945 Yugoslav land
reform looked to the future in several importan t respects .

First, since

poorer peasants would have both less to lose and more to gain from

joining collecti ves, the continue d fragmen tation of holdings can be
viewed as at least consiste nt with if not a delibera te part of prepara 
tions for eventua l collecti vization .

Thus rectucing the number of "kulaks"

-- even though they were the peasants most likely to produce for market -
made sense, because tbe long run goal was to achieve marketin gs by means
of collecti ve farming, as the Soviet Union had done.

46

Consiste nt with

this interpre tation, the Yugoslav leaders continue d to limit private
,easant holdings to subsiste nce size during and after the collecti vization
campaign .
A second forward -looking measure associat ed with the 1945 land reform
11
was the distribu tion or' ha.lf of the 1.and fund to socialis t" -- state -r
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co-ope rative -- groups (see Table 2).

The Yugosl av "agric ultura l

estate s, '1 which receive d slightl y more than a quarte r of the agricu ltural
land in the fund, were modell ed after the Soviet sovkho z, and were
intende d to provid e models of modern cultiva tion and husban dry techni ,ues
47 To induce the
and to be a spearhe ad of sociali sm in rural areas.
peasan ts to form collec tives and other types of co-ope ratives , simulta ne
ously with the land. reform the governm ent introdu ced discrim inatory 1'rices •
compul sory deli very quotas , and taxes, along with a networ·K of machin e
48 The
tracto r station s which contro lled the use of all farm machin ery.
collec tives, called "Peasa nt Work. Co-ope ratives " (PWC) (Seljac ke Racine
Zadrug e) and pattern ed after the traditi onal zadrug a of the upland
region s, 49 eventu ally served as the model for the collec tivizat ion drive
which began in 1949. The other co-ops , groupe d under the title of
Genera l Agricu ltural Co-ope ratives " ( GAC) ( Op~te Zemljo radni Zadrug e),
replace d the market ing and purcha sing co-ops left over from the interw ar

11

Tne GAC 1 s, which (with the aid of the persua sions mention ed.
50 eventu ally assume d a
above) grew rapidly in member ship up to 1948,
centra l role in Yugosl av agricu ltural policy when the collec tivizat ion

period .

was disman tled.

B.

We examin e the PWC's and GAC's furthe r in section V.

The Czecho slovak. Land Reform s

As shown in Table 4, the Czecho slovak land reform s of 19451948 occurre d in three stages. , two prior and one subseq uent to the
Communist takeov er in Februa ry 1948. Of these three stages , only the
first two -- which were redistr ibutiv e reform s in the usual sense of
the term -- will concern us here. The third stage is more appro~ riately

---- ·-·- ---· - ·----

.

TABLE 4
REASSIGNMENT OF LAND
THE CZECHOSLOVAK LAND REFORMS OF 1245-1948:~_ACQUISITION AND

Reassi~nment of the Land Fund
(thous ands of hectar es)
Land Fund
Acqui redl
( thous-ands
of hectar es)

Percen tage
of the Total
Land Fund

Indivi dual
Peasan ts

38

l,525a /
{l,;200)

State
Fores t
Adm.in.

Other

State
Farms

Land Trans fer
Decre e, 11 June 21,
1945 (ex-enenzy-,
collab orator s)

0

a.

..

Agric ultura l
Land

1,772
(1,651 )

b.

Forest

1,251
(1,295 )

27

c.

Total

3,023
(2,946 )

65

"Revis ion Bill,' '
1947 (Completion
of interw ar land
reform )

940

20

"New Land Feform
Act, 11 1948

700p/

15

TOTAL

-

4,663

100

--

-

l,525a /
(1,.200)

140

--Pl

50
(6.6)

197
(258)

1,115
..Jbl~ )___

136
_J__199}

(186.5 )

I

N

'°
I

1,165
(1~108 .6)

--

333
(457)

--

(186~5)

800
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Source s:

Top figure: Koenig in Busek and Spulbe r, pp. 248-250;
bottom figure (in parenth esis} : Menclova. and Sto'6es , ·
p.

58.

Top figure , to private peasan ts and co-ope ratives ;
bottom figure (in parent hesis), to private peasan ts
only.
Koenig (see ·source s), p. 250, gives only 130,000 ha.
actual ly approp riated; this lower figure is also
given by Spulbe r 1971, p. 84. Whatev er the figure ,
ts.
nC'·1-.; of the land was distrib uted tp private peasan
the
into
d
blende
s
reform
the
of
~- ,. . ~-' ·, ~. :.. . , +hird stage
1948.
in
collec tivizat ion program , begun later
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alc col lec tiv iza tio n.
trea ted in sec tion VI on the Cze cho slov
la.n d refo rms , ena cte< i int o law
The !""i rst stag e of the Cze cho slov a·it
e 194 5 and bil led as the lib era tio n
as the "Land. Tra nsr" 'er Dec ree" of Jun
11
11
nat ion al ene mie s, was bac lted
the
from
ds
lan
alc
Slov
and
ch
Cze
of the
coa liti on gov ernm ent, inc lud ing the
by all par ties in the pos twa r Ben es
t of the tot al lan d fun d cre ate d in
Com mun ists . App rox ima tely 80 per cen
gs of Sud eten Germans in Boh emi a
thi s fir st stag e came from the hol din
t of the agr icu ltu ral lan d exp ro
and Mo rav ia. All but abo ut 15 per cen
san t set tle rs. The lar ges t
pri ate d was dis trib ute d to pri vat e pea
as;
wer e in the form er Sud eten German are
gra nts -- 8-1 3 hec tare s
so sma ll tha t ove r...- all the ave rag e
else whe re, how eve r, the gra nts wer e

51

siz e of a gra nt was onl y 4 hec tare s.
ak Communist Par ty sup por ted
For tac tic al rea son s, the Cze cho slov
52
ts.
san
pea
e
vat
pri
to
d
fun
d
lan
the dis trib uti on of mos t of the 1945
ign orin g stra teg ic con sid era tion s.
But at the same tim e the Par ty was not
frag men tati on of agr icu ltu ral
As in the Yug osla v cas e, the fur the r
lon g-ra nge goa l of col lec tiv iza 
hol din gs was not inc ons iste nt wit h the
reta ine d by the sta te. More
tion , and par t of the lan d fun d was
d of the fir st stag e of the refo rms
fun
d
lan
the
ore
bef
n
eve
,
ntly
orta
imp
Par ty was abl e to pus h thro ugh the
had bee n com ple tely dis trib ute d, the
11
11
n-o f-th e-L and -Re form Bil l of l94 7.
isio
Rev
the
in
d
odie
emb
ge,
sta
ond
sec
coa liti on gov ernm ent into ado ptin g
The Par ty was als o abl e to pro d the
r wea ken ing the infl uen ce of the
sup plem enta ry pol icie s aim ed at fur the
for eve ntu al soc iali st form s in
larg e lan dho lde rs and pav ing the way
the cou ntry sid e.
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gs c,f
In contr ast to the 1945 Decre e,, which dealt with landh oldin
11
the :i.arge
11
enem ies of the peopl e,, the 1947 Revis ion Bill struc k at

53

ian reform .
Czech oslov ak holdi ngs which had escap ed the interw ar agrar
holdi ng was
On its face the Revis ion Bill was not sever e: The maximum
54
hecta res.
set at 150 hecta res of agric ultur al land and a total of 250
perm itti~g
As final ly passe d, howe ver, the Bill conta ined a provi sion
11
of urgen t
confi "cati on of holdi ngs in exces s of 50 hecta res in cases
11
local need or if the publi c inter est deman ds it

--

a provi sion, admin i

ned to
stere d by a Comm unist Mini ster of Agric ultur e, clear ly desig
polit ical
intim idate middl e and large peasa nts and to break down their
oppo sition , 55

Only about one-s ixth of the land expro priate d under tie

to 100,0 00
Revis ion Bill -- some 140.0 00 hecta res -- was reass igned
of l.4
priva te peasa nt fami lies, givin g a very small avera ge grant
~ecta res.

n
Most of the Revis ion Bill land fund was reser ved for g~ver

ment use.

~r•eu reSup,l emen ting the Revis ion Bill were polic ies deali ng with
5 6 A mo d.i1ie
'. d f orm o f ta
.,e
. . a t ion.
t al..Loc
.
.
an d inpu
t co-op era t ives,
men,
comp ulsory
warti me agric ultur al procu remen t system , which includ ed.
, tfte Mini stry
~uota s, was insti tuted after the war. Under this system
struc tu»e
of Agric ultur e (head ed by a Comm unist) estab lishe d a price
indiv idual
diffe renti ated accor ding to the amoun t of arabl e land in
hecta res) were
holdi ngs: Produ cts from the smal lest holdi ngs (unde r 20
50 hecta res)
assig ned the highe st price s 1 those from the large st (over
produ cts and
the lowe st. In addit ion 1 the relat ive price s of lives tock
incre ased.
rye -- produ ced mainl y by small and middl e farme rs -- were
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In the agricultu ral marketing and purchasing co-operat ives held
over from before the war, the coalition governmen t passed regulation s
restrictin g the leadership role of the

11

bourgeois ie, n i.e. , farmers

whose landholdin gs exceeded 20 hectares, and enhancing the role of the
The governmen t also pl.aced considera ble emphasis

"laboring farmers."

on setting up machinery co-operat ives led by smaller peasants; some
5,600 such co-ops were reportedly establishe d between 1945 and 1948.
Finally 1 the Communis t-controlle d Ministry of Agricultu re exercised
strict control over allocation s of fertilizer and new machinery ; much
of the latter was allocated to state-owne d machine-t ractor stations.
A "Two-Year Plan11 adopted early in

1947 called for substanti al increases

in such non-labor inputs to compensat e for the exodus o!, labor from
agricultu re required by the ambitious targets for industry.

In spite

of some success in meeting the non-labor input goals) however 1 the
governmen t periodica lly had to send squads of industria l workers to
rural areas to help with sowing and harvesting and with machinery
maintenan ce and repair.
Hence the agricultu ral program of the Czechoslov ak Communist s (and
of the national governmen t in Prague) during the 1945-1948 period,
like that of their Yugoslav counterpa rts, was a combinatio n of tactical
conciliati on towards private peasants and strategic preparatio ns for the
future.

Their support of redistribu tive land reform helped gain rural

support for the Party and also weakened potential oppositio n to socialist
ins ti tut ions 'in the countrysid e.
landowner s and the

11

The cost of persecutin g the large

·Kulak" peasants -- chiefly> reduction s in marketing s

would decline sharply, it was felt) once the Party had the opportuni ty to
implement its long range strategy of collectiv ization.

-34V. · Yugosl av Collec tivizat ion and Its Afterm ath
A.

The Yugosl av Collec tivizat ion, 1949-1953
In July 1948, the Fifth Congre ss of the Yugosl av Commu nist

Party endorse d a decisio n to procee d with collec tivizat ion as soon as
possib le. Tnis decisio n was part of the Yugosl av respon se to their
expuls ion, one month earlie r, from the Cominf orm.

Collec tivizat ion

was intende d to help refute the Cominfo rm charge s that the Yugosl av
1157 In additio n, it also ~ro
11
Commu nists were guilty of revisio nism.
vided the Tito governm ent with a dramat ic domest ic program around whicli\
to rally Party member s -- includ ing the ruling hierar~ hy as well as the
ra•k-a nd-file --who were$u nnect by the expuls ion and confuse ~ by t•e

o~Bn invita tion from Moscow to depose Marsha l Tito.
The Cominf orm expuls ion had other implic ations which direct ly
affecte d the role of the Yugosl av collec tivizat ion. The governm ent
res~onc ted to this extern al threat with ambitio us plans to expand industr y
and milita ry streng th. As D result, planned investm ents were realloc ated
to industr y and defense activi ties, at the expense of other sector s of
the econom y; agricu lture suffere d a cut from 10.5 to 4.2 percen t in its

58
share of total gross investm ent betwee n 1949 and 1952.

The trade

boycot t by the Cominfo rm countr ies which accomp anied the expuls ion cteal.t
a heavy blow to Yugosl av export possib ilities and. hence to her foreign
59
exchang e earning capaci ty.

The combin ation of the investm ent reallo 

cations and the trade boycot t confro nted Yugosl av agricu ltural policy
with a dif!'ic ult set of circum stances . De facto, collec tivizat ion
became mainly an instrum ent for extrac ting a '' tribute " of resourc es from agricu lture; the modern ization of produc tion techniq ues would have to
At the same time, the rest of the economy became more depend ent
on agricu lture for increas ed food and raw materi al sur,plie s because . of

wait.
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the trade boycott.

Thus a premium was placed on sood ,rod.uction results

in agriculture, pre<?isely at a time when its production capacity was
placed in jeopardy.
The final program for collectivization, ap~roved by the Party Central
Committee in January 1949 ., was embodied in the II Basic Law on Agricultural
Co-operatives, passed. in June 1949. 60 The Brsic Law provided for four
types of "Peasant Work Co-operatives 11 (PWC) (named after the collectives
__ t,_f.-

the -l.94S--i9-48 period), representing ascending degrees of socialist

rerfection.
11

As can be seen from the description in the Appendix, the

highest 11 type (IV) was basically the Soviet kolkhoz.

The other three

types, especially I and II with their wage, rental and interest payments,
were regarded as ~reliminary and transitional forms, mere stepping stones
to the ultimate "socialist transformation of the village. 11

Under the

basic law, peasants who joined collectives contracted. to stay at least
three years 61 -- a mechanical feature which nevertheless was to hel,
precipitate the decision to abancton collectivization, as we show below.
The Tito government, having learned the bitter lessons of the early
years of the Soviet drive, avoided massive physical coercion in im~le
menting collectivization.
positive ,ersuasion:

The proclamations from Belgrade em,hasized

eduoate the peasants on the virtues of socialism,

and d.emonstrate its advantages in practice; the peasants will then join
62 However,
the PWC's and move to the higher types of their own volition.
strong economic and social pressures were brought to bear on the Yugoslav
peasantry.

The practical advantages of joining a. PWC were greatly en

hanced by discriminatory taxes, delivery quotas, and prices (for in,uts,
outputs, and consumer goods) similar to those apt,liect against private

-36peasants before 1949.

63

The machine-t ractor stations continued to give

preferenc e to socialist farms, in the form of lower rates and better
availabil ity of services w:1en needed.

Finally, where the economic

advantage s of the collective s p~oved to be an inadequat e incentive ,
local party cadres -- well acquainted with the preferenc es of the party
leadership for rapid col::_e:-tiv ization and the higher types of PWC
64
·
· · d t ion.
· t imi-a
...
. . k rrom
in
dl. d no t snrin
The course of the Yugoslav collectiv ization is shown in Table 5.
Parallel to Soviet experienc e, during the first year of the campaign,

1949, the PWC's grew rapidly:

the number of collective s and the number

of member peasant household s quintupled , while total membershi p and
collectiv e area 65 increased even faster. Unlike the Soviet case, however,
the second year, 1950, saw only minor additiona l gains, and in 1951
there were slig:nt declines.

Thus the momentum of the vigorous first

year of collectiv ization was entirely dissipated by the end of the third
year.
Moreover, the degree of the "socia)_is t transform ation of the village"
attained under the c.ollec ti vization prog:::am was modest at best:

In the

peak year of 1950, tl1e c;.;::. \ecti ves acc01.;mted for only one-sixth of peasant
household s and abcut one--fifth of Yugosl.av landholdin gs.

Even when state

farm landholdin gs are added in, the combined socialist shares came to
only one-thirc'. of agricnltu:: '.'al lane: and one-quart er of cultivable and
66 Alsc, on~.y 4. 7 percent of the total number of collective s
arable land.
in 1950 ( 328 of 6, 96 1t ~ we::e of the highest form, Type IV; the lowest
forms, Types I and II, accounted for 47 ?ercent, and Type III for the
remainder . 67

·-· ----.-----· ·--·--··-·-- - -·· . ---····--

/
TABLE

2..
§:../ IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1945-1960

liPEASANT WORK CO-OPERATIVEe"(PWC)
(1)

YE.AR

NUMBER OF
PWC 1 S
(ALL TYPES)b/

(2)

( 3)

PEASANT HOUSEHOLDS IN PWC'S
%of I
Total.£
000

(4)

(5)

MEMBERS
OF
PWC'S
000

TOTAL
COLLECTIVE
AREA d/
000 ha.

(7)

(6)

LANDHOLDINGS OF
. PWC'S

(Agric ultura l Land)S:J'
%of Total
000 ha.

1945

14

n.a.

n. a.

n.a.

96

n.a.

n.a.

1946

280

25

n.a.

75

122

n.a.

n. a.

1947

638

41

n.a.

175

211

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

286

324

187£

1948

68

2.6f/

1,217
6~238

1,708

1,839

1,269

1949

13.l

. 9.1

342

16.1

2,129

2,190

2,472

1950

419

17.8

6,913

16.1

2,004

2,074

2,595

1951

418

18.5

6,804

12.6

1~505

1,665

2,503

1952

323

17.8

43225

n. a.

194

329

315

2.2

1,165

62

1.1

116

281

278

1.9

896

48

213

561

87

213

1956

1.5

1.4

36

1958

n.a.

206

1.3

n. a.

n.a.

199

384

1960

n.a.

132

0.9

n.a.

n.a.

128

147

1953
1954

'
......
v.)

I

[Table 5]
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Source s:

Jugosl avija 1945-1 964, pp. 97, 99, 111, 113.
Stat. god. 1955, pp. 110, 131.
Ibid., 1956, pp. 99, 123.
Ibid.
11

1958, pp. 111, 132.

2

11
Zemljor ad.nick o zadrug arstvo, 31. XII. 1952 (Land- tilling
Co-ope rative Syst®l , as of Dec. 31, 1952),- Statist icki
Bullet in), broj 37, Dart 1955, p. 40.

11

Ratarst vo 1952n(Crop :f_arning 1952), Statist icki bilten ,
broj 21, septemb ar 1958, pp. 6-7.

11

11
Poljop rivreda (Agric ulture) , Statis ticki bilten , broj 3,
novenb er 1950, p. 30.

Tomase vich in Sander s, pp. 170, 173.
Hoffman and Neal, pp. 270-271 .

Footno tes:
a/

Seljatk e Rad.ne Zadruge (SRZ).

b/

Collec tives 0 covered n (obuhva cene) in the various censuse s.,
some of which relied on self-re gistrat ion (e.g., see
Stat. god. 1955 ~ p ._ 107). · The propor ti~n of coverag e
increas es with tirae:
a covered '?..tota l

1945
. 1946
1947
1948
1949
1950

PWC' s

14/31
280/454
638/779
l,217/1 ,318
6,238/6 ,626
6,913/6 ,964

(See Tomasevich in Sander s, p. 173).
PWC househ olds divided by the quanti ty, (total privat e
agricu ltural househ olds+ PWC househ olds).
11
Exclud es members I private plots and so-call ed unorga nized
lands 11 (mostly pasture , wetlan ds, and forest) ; see Jugosl avija
1945-1 964, p. 110.

.Agricu ltural;; land (poljop rivredn a povrsin11 a) = Cultiva ble
land+ pasture s and wetlan ds. "Cultiv able land (obrad iva
povrsin a) = arable land+ orchar ds, vineya rds and meadows.
11

[Table 5]
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liArablen land (orani~n a povrsina ) = plowlan d or cropland
(cereal grainss industr ial crops, truck gardens , etc.).·
Data for cultivab le and arable land.hol dings of PWC's show
~maller totals (as we would expect) and slightly higher
proporti ons than for agricul tural land; over time, the
movements are broadly similar to those for agricul tural
land. See footnote 65 for a discussi on of the discrepa ncies
between collecti ve and agricul tural area (columns 5 and 6).
f/

Arable land.
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co- op lab or was not ade qua tely tied
to del ive r the orig ina~ Lly pro mis ed
·done_; (b) the gov ernm ent was una ble
and liv esto c}: whi ch wou ld hav e
mac hin ery , fer tili zer , imp rov ed see ds
69 ( c) exc essi ve- . cen tral
e farm ing ;
el"\hanced the attr act ion of col lec tiv
duc tion ins ens itiv e to var iati ons
con tro l made the org ani zat ion of pro
tive s foll owe d onl y the mos t
in gro win g con diti ons ; (ct) the col lec
(e) many farm man age rs wer e
rud ime nta ry acc oun ting pro ced ure s; and
for suc c-es sful larg e-s cal e farm ing .
uns kill ed in the tech niq ues nec ess ary
led col lec tivi zed pea san ts .to shu n
Not sur pri sin gly , suc h def icie nci es
whi ch
d on the ir pri vat e plo ts
col lec tiv e work. and con cen trat e ins tea
e lan d and oth er inp uts , out sid e
mor
h
wit
,
ter
bet
e
don
e
hav
ld
cou
y
the
in 1951 of the thr ee- yea r con trac ts
70
ion
irat
exp
the
er,
reov
Mo
C's.
PW
the
s in 1949, at the out set of the
or pea san ts who had join ed col lec tive
s to lea ve the PWC's and , in spi te
dri ve, bro ugh t a rus h of app lica tion
y act ual dep artu res .
of det err ent s (inc lud ing arr est ), man
tio n pro gra m, the Yug osla v
On top of the spu tter ing col lec tiv iza
pro blem . A sev ere dro ugh t made the
lea der s in 1951 fac ed a gro win g foo d
eig n exc han ge res ~rv es (alr ead y
1950 har ves t a dis ast er. As a res ult , for
wer e draw n down to pay for foo d
imp eril ed by the Com info rm boy cot t)

i

\ ..

. L..

-41Unfortuna tely, the 1951 harvest also fell below expectatio ns,
71
because of continuing difficulti es on the collective farms.
imports.

Tne confluenc e of the food problem and the collective farm troubles
forced the Yugoslav governmen t to rethink its agricultu ral program
In a directive issued in November of that year,
72
1
the governmen t announced plans to reorganize and strengthen the PWC s.

toward the end of 1951.

The "labor day 11 system was to be replaced by a money-wag e scheme based
more l'i.irectly on contributi on to total collective product.

Profitabi lity"

Managemen t was

accountin g procedure s were ordered for all collective s.

- ,.

11

_.. to be turned over to collective members, parallelin g the shift to
11
·

~--

workers' councils" in industry.

Finally, state subsidies to financiall y

weak collective s were to be reduced and eventually ended; thereafte r,.
73
PWC 1 s making losses were to be disbanded .
. In addition to announcin g the measures to improve PWC performan ce,
however, the November 1951 directive sounded a note of ambivalen ce
towards the PWC 1 s.

Reflecting the continued concentra tion of investmen t

on industry and defense, no mention was made of measures to ease the
crucial shortage of machinery and other inputs required to strengthen
large-sca le collective farming.

Moreover, the directive stipulated

that hencefort h greater em?hasis would be placed on the

11

General

- Agricultu ral Co-operat ives 11 ((}AC:} •.. Thus, the PWC 1 s would no longer-"b-e---------------
the exclusive instrumen ts of the "socialis t transform ation of the
·village."

This shift of emphasis, along with new regulation s governing

priva~_e___p_e_asants, 74 augured the eventual course of Yugoslav agricultu ral
policy after 1953, as we show below.
/__,.,-/'

,.._,_,.,--
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Tne main result of the November 1951 directive and the related

measures was the dissolutio n during 1952 of some 2,600 PWC 1 s, most of
them in mountaino us regions of Bosna-Her cegovina and Slovenia rather
75 On
than in the more fertile areas like the Vojvodina and Slavonia.
the surviving PWC's and elsewhere in Yugoslav agricultu re, the situation
continued to deteriora te.

The deteriora tion was aggravated by delays

in implement ing the measures in the directive designed to strengthen
the PWC's, and by a recurrence of drought during the 1952 growing sea.son.
By early 1953, then, with foreign exchange reserves nearly exhausted
76
and severe food shortages still in prospect in spite of American a.ict,
it was apparent that further, more basic changes in the Yugoslav agri
cultural program were necessary .

The leadership faced two options:

to

make a major effort to reverse the direction of the collectiv ization
drive and regain the momentum of 1949, as the Soviet leaders had done
77 or further to cur
under anhogous circumstan ces in the early l930's,
tail collectiv ization and embrace an alternativ e program.

Constrain ing

the choice between these options was a continuing commitmen t to rapid
industria lization, supported by a tribute from agricultu re, and to the
78 The policy choice ca me down,
moderniz~ .tion of agricultu ral technique ,
then, to whether a revitalize d collectiv ization effort would be more
effective , given existing and prospectiv e condition s, than some alterna
tive program.
The first option, renewing the effort to imitate the Soviet pre
cedent, was not attractive to the Yugoslav governmen t for several
reasons.

First, to get the collectiv ization campaign back in motion in

1953 would have required considera ble coercion.

In addition to adding

-43-

to administr ative burdens, coercion would have disrupted the countrysid e,
certainly to the detriment of the already desperate food situation ,
and perhpas to the point of civil war and possible Soviet interventi on.
M,')reover, attemptin g to revitalize the collectivi zation campaign would
have risked the important political gains achieved since 1948.

Internally .

the Communist Party -- and Marshall Tito -- had not only weathered the
expulsion from the Cominform but furthEr consolida ted their power as
well. 79

Externally , the political climate was becoming less hostile to

Yugoslavi a, and several Cominform countries were themselve s undergoin g
or about to undergo pauses in collectiv ization, as part of the nNew

c,:,urse" which followed the death of Stalin in March 1953.

Thus by 1953

the political opportuni ty costs of departing from the imitation of
Soviet-st yle collectiv ization were much lower than in 1948.
In the spring of 1953', the Yugoslav leaders chose the second option -
further curtailme nt of collectiv ization and e-,::i~:friti tut ion of an al terns.tive
scheme -- and moved swiftly to carry it out.

1951 was superseded by the

11

The directive of November

Regulation on Property Relations and the

11
Reorganiz ation of Peasant Work Co-operat ives of March 30, 1953.

beyond the

11

Moving

consolida tion 11 of the earlier directive , this regulation

permitted peasants to resign from PWC's at any time, taking with them
whatever land and equipment they had contribute d.

By vote of the members,

entire collective s could disband, with the land and other contribute d
assets reassigned to the original owners.

Land given to the PWC 1 s by

the state was turned over to neighborin g GAC's or to the local authoritie s~

80
Dissolutio n was mandatory for all collective s making losses.
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A

second official step in the retrenchm ent from collectiv ization
11

was a second postwar land reform, codified in the

Law on the National

11
Land Pool and the Allotment of Land to Agricultu ral Organizat ions

of May 22, 1953.

Under this law, the state acquired (for nominal

compensat ion) all privately held, cultivable land in excess of 10
hectares per holding for individua ls, and 15 hectares for families and
individua ls in

11

poor land'' districts.

81

As shown in Table 6, the lanri

fund created by this reform came to only 276 thousand hectares, as
compared with the 1,566 thousand hectares of the 1945 reform (Table 1).
The 1953 reform was, however, more broadly felt among the private peasant
ry, since it affected over 66 thousand peasant holdings in contrast to
only 25.4 thousand (of which 2,650 were large estates, a category that

disappeare d after 1945) in the 1945 reform.

82

The 1953 land reform was billed as a move to suppress ncapitali st
forces" in agricultu re.

Indeed, the new size limitation s were aimed at

the total eliminatio n of hired labor on private holdings.

82

However,

the small amount of land involved and. the timing of the law suggest that
the primary goals of the reform -- as with earlier changes in the official
stance towards private landholdin gs -- were to strengthen Party morale
and to symbolize central control over land rights at a time when the
governmen t 1,vas undertakin g a shift away from the

11

respectab le" Soviet

type collective farm, to a substitute socialist form of its own devising.
Predictab ly, during 1953 the number of collective s, and with it the
other dimension s of the collective farm sector, declined even more
sharply than in 1952 (see Table 5).

84

In spite of a lingering commit

85
ment to the PWC 1 s on the part of the Yugoslav leadership beyond 1953,

TABLE 6
V LAND REFOR~
ACQUISITION AND REASSIGNMENT OF THE LAND FUND CREATED UNDER THE 1953 YUGOSLA

No.

Yugosl avia
(entire )

66,459

Serbia
Vojvod ina

44,076
19,843

Reassig nment of the
Land Fund (000 ha.)

Land
Ac.9_uired

Affecte d
-Holdin gs

%

100
66.3
29.8

000 ha.

275.9
193,7
100.6

(Jf

/J

100
70.2
36.4

Total

b/
22 6 ,9-

169.7
100.3

State
Farms

PWC's

GAC's

103,5

80.8

42.6

66.6
42.2

70.9
51.9

32.2
6.2
I

.r---

V1
;

Source :

Jugosl avija 1945-1 964, p. 109.

a/ --

Organi zations
nLaw on the Nation al Land Pool and the Allotm ent of Land to Agricu ltural
(May 22, 1953)

pj --

Approx imately 50,000 hectare s had not been distrib uted by 1955,
was land of poorer quality .

Presum ably this

11

-46t~e role of collec~ive farming steadily dwindled with time, reaching
the point of insignific ance by 1960.

B.

The Yugc.sJav .A.s:,:icul tu:cal P::.nogram after 1953
'r:1.us the era oi' col}.ectiv ization was effective ly over in

Yugoslavi a by 1953,

Fo'..u.- years cf imitating Soviet agricultu ral

institutio ns had revea:Led, ~-:.ot s-J mu-:h that they were inappropr iate

per s~ to Yugoslav

eco:1;:,;_nic co:c1di ticns, b-J.t t/1.at the costs of j_mplement 

ing them fully -- p2v:,.-t.ic:..:.:..a2-::_y o:f ,::oercing the peasants to join collective
farms -- ttE11ec.

01-:'.t

t,~ be /1-igi;.e:·.' t>.an was warranted by the expected

results.
In devising 1~l. 2 .s::c ces.scc l.Jrcgram to co11ecti vi zation. however,
the Yugc-sla.vs d.Lt not entL e::.y abandon the Soviet. precedent .
0

In par-

ci.c.ular 1 they retc:,inei.:'. t>e oas:Lc. :Soviet st:::'a,tegy of inci.ustria lization,

7
pa~allelin g Sov:et c~pe2·ienc e in the l930 s, Yugoslav expectatio ns of

than they were ir:. :i.s::?, (::,,-·~ -~.':·;e :_;-:_t.:-:"e'~ o~:' indust:. la:U.zation and col:ecti
86 .f\g:::i:_.;.-~ -;~\:· 2 ;:~-:-,1:_:i_ ila.-1 t,_, )YOTi.ie e, \'trib'J.te 11 of cneap food
vizatic:1,

of moderniza tion.
At the sanie tine, t!l.e :·

_::3:::

c.ec:'..sic:.'1 r;.ct to settle the

II

ag:carian questionn

The major premise of the Yugoslav agricultural program after 1953
was the deliberate creation of a 11 dualism" within the agricultural
sector. 86 a In contrast to the earlier goal of collectivizin g most of
agricultural production, attention was concentrated after 1953 on a
reduced number of socialist farms working a relatively small proportion
of total agricultural land.

While the conciliatory gestures made

towards private peasants in 1951 and. 1952 were continued, and while no
direct penalties were imposed on those peasants who chose to shift for
themselves rather than affiliate with socialist farms, such peasants
were denied access to the main opportunitie s for self-improvem ent.

A

determined effort was made, es·pecially after 1955, to enhance those
opportunitie s, in order to convince private peasants of the advantages
of co-operating with the socialist segment of agriculture.

The ma.in pillars of the post-1953 Yugoslav agricultural program
were increased agricultural investment and two socialist agricultural
institutions , the "agricultura l estate" (the Yugoslav analogue of the
Soviet state farm) and an expanded Version of the earlier

11

General

Agricultural Co-operative ."
Agriculture' s share of total gross investment rose steadily after
1953, reattaining the 1948 level of about 10 percent by 1956.

The Second

Five-Year Plan (1957-1961), which was prepared in 1955 and :r.956, cal.led
for a further doubling of this share, out of a rising total investment
87 Most of the investment funds supplied
figure, by the early 1960 1 s.
by the federal government (under the less centralized political organiza
tion adopted in 1952) went to the agricultural estates; republican and
88
communal (local) government funds went mainly to the GAC's.
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After 1953, the agricultural estates finally became the models of
large-scale, technically modern agriculture that the government had
initially hoped they would be.

Through increased investments and a

reorganizatio n of management) yields on the estates rose rapidly, both
absolutely and relatively; superior techniques gave the estates far
greater resistance to bad weather than other farms, socialist as well
as private. 8 9 Tne elite, qualitative role of the Yugoslav agricultural
estates is illustrated by their small proportion of agricultural land
90 Also, the average
in comparison with that of the Soviet state farms.
land area of the Yugoslav agricultural estates has never approached
the mammoth acreages of their Soviet counterparts , reflecting (in
addition to the absence among Yugosl.av leaders of a fetish of "giantism") ·
91
the basic differences in the two countries' agricultural conditions.
As foreshadowed in the November 1951 directive, after 1953 the
General Agricultural Co-operative s (GAC) became the main vehicle of
socialization , not only of agricultural.p roduction but of the whole of
Yugoslav rural society.
their diversity.

The notable feature of the post-1953 GAC's was

To the purchasing, procurement and limited extension

services performed by the earlier variant were added the provision of
machinery services, maintenance and repair; livestock breeding and
raising; provision of fertilizers and new varieties of seed; fruit-tree
md crop spraying; and -- perhaps most important to long-range goals for

rural socialization -- the organization of co-operative crop production
on co-operative ly owned or leased land.
The expanded GAC's were also charged with promoting the consolidation
and joint cropping of individual peasant plots, and with establishing

-4911

2
branch 11 enterprises for food and material processing.9
The expansion of the GAC's 1 particularly after 1955, can be seen

in Tables 7 and 8.

Note that this expansion included a rapid rise in

the average land area of a GAC, from both increases in co-operative
landholdings and reductions in the number of individual GAC's through
consolidation (columns 1 and 2, Table

7).

In other dimensions, the share

of total private peasant marketings procured through the GAC's rose from

25 percent in 1954 to almost 70 percent by 1958; and by the latter year,
according to Kardelj, the GAC's were supplying an important part of bulk
1193
shipments for large orders and the "bulk of agricultural exports.
Supporting the expansion of the GAC's was a five-fold increase in total
GAC investments between 1954 and 1958, accompanied by a decided shift
in the structure of the investments in favor of modern equipment.

The

resulting growth in GAC productive assets is illustrated for selected
types of machinery in columns 6-9 of Table 7.
Tne social role of the GAC's in the Yugoslav countryside grew
drectly out of their expanded economic role.

The 1953 decision not to

force collectivization did not imply that the Yugoslav leaders had abandoned
the goal of building socialism in rural areas and given in to private
peasant interests.

In the words of Edvard Kardelj,

11

•••

If socialist

society does not intend to drive the peasant off his land by force, ••.
neither does it intend to keep and support his small-property illusions
artifically with subsidies. 1194

Rather, the new policy was one or, gradual

socialization of private agriculture> using persuation augmented by firm
pressures against private farmers.

TABLE 7
''GENERAL AGRICULTURAL CO-·OPERATIVESn (GAC)2-/ HJ YUGOSLAVIA, 1950-1965
(1)

End of
Year

Humber of
GAC's

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Livestock Owned by GAC 1 s
Landholdings
Total Land
Agricultural
Tilled Co-operatively
Land Owned
Swine
Cattle
(incl. Leased)
by GAC 1 s
000 ha.

000 ha.

000

000

1950

8,004

33.0

63.4

4.1

3.8

1951

7,581

40.1

28.8

3.4

3.3

1952

6,973

n.a.

75.5

6.2

8.0

1953

7,114

116.0

131. 7

9.5

13.2

1954

6,538

128.1

145,0

10.5

21.8

1955

6,066

134.6

148.8

13.4

31.8

1956

5,576

n.a.

181.2

12.4

20.8

1957

5,472

188.1

202.6

15.4

21.2

1958

5,242

267. 7

289.6

26.9

56.5

1959

4,817

399.3

429.0

70.0

102.1

1960

4,086

605.3

652.6

123.0

169.4

1961

3,228

625.1

691.4

99.6

167.7

1962

2,816

701.1

751.9

107.1

193.3

1963

2,438

829.2

899.4

107.8

229.6

1964

2,096

896. 7

961.7

119.3

214.8

1965

1,937

903.3

n.a.

128.0

210.2
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[Continued]

TABLE 7 (cont.)
11

GENERAL AGRICULTURAL CO-OPER ATIVESn (GAC)~/ IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1950-196 5

(7)

(6)

(8)

(9)

1
Agricul tural i.fachine ry Owned by GAC s

(10)
Artific ial Fertiliz ers
Kg/ha.on
Land Tilled
by GAC 1 s

Tractor s

Seed Drills
for Cereals

i:iowing
i:fachine s

lfotorize d
Threshe rs

000

000

000

000

0.05

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

0.03

n.a.

n.. a.

n.ao

n.a.

0.5

0.1

0.4

0.8

n.a.

2.0

0.2

0.9

2.2

n.a.

n.• a.

n.a.

n.a..

Il.:oiao

58

2.7

0.3

1.0

3.0

140

4.1

0.4

1. 3

3.7

6.3

0.8

1.5

4.5

732

10.0

1.9

2.0

5.8

603

15.0

2.9

2.6

6.6

695

16.4

3.3

2.8

6.6

560

16. 7 ·

3.5

2.9

5.6

506

18.1

4.1

2.9

5.0

747

19.1

4.2

2.7

4.6

826

19.0

3.9

2.4

4.5

776

18.7

3.8

2.1

4.2

795

Sources~

n~a.

Jugosla vija 1945-19 64, pp. n1£I, ll5; Stat. god. 1955, p. 130;
1956, pp. 121-122 ; 1958, pp. lll, 130, 478; 1960, pp. 116, 139;
1962, pp. 130, 363; 1964, pp. 162, 412-413, 414-415; 1968, PP•
145, 148, 150, 151, 387-388.

Op~te Zenljora dnicke Zadruge (OZZ).

b/

s.J

Includin g inputs used on land of private peasants co-oper ating with GAC's.
Data shown are correcte d for a typogra phical error (1953 data are onitted,
and 1947-195 2 data are reported as 1948-195 3, for numbers of cattle, swine,
sheep, and horses). See Stat. god. 1956, p. 121, and 1958, p. 130.

.. ~· ~.......
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TABLE 8
1
ESTATES IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1955-1 967
CO-OPERATION OF PRIVATE PEASANTS WITH GAC s AND AGRICULTURAL

(1)

(2)

of

YEAR

I

V1
I-'
I

(5)

(6)

Uo. of
Co·-op erators !!!_I

Plowin [ (includ in[';
"Deep; Flowin g)

Sowing

Harve sting

Thresh ing

(7)

(8)

Inputs Suppli ed to
Co-oE erators
Artifi cial
·wheat
Fertili ze::-s
Seed
000
000
,:,1etric
r:ietric
tons
tons

000

000

000 ha,

000 ha,

000 ha.

000
metric
tons

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

139.0

n.a.

11.1

1,443

n ao

1955

131.£/

24

20

384

230.0

1956

339'E.../

30.1

1,286

302

29

64

31.8

377. 7

1957

53t);l_/

1,011

1,405

56

68

861

Q
Vo_,

477 ,5

1,371

397

40

n.a.

137

213

1,356

63.6

1,507

560

546.8

548

116

194

1,425

32L3

1,463

627

64.1

578

1"0
L.,

130

784

458.7

1,425

674

85.9

590

222

150

859

588.1

1,397

937

169.3

730

379

1,455

118.5

900

251

796 .6

1,154

303

1,301

76.6

925

211

831.9.

%9

1,538

77 .2

914

230

1,421

226

825.9

1,036

294

1,632

1,345

256

995.9

1,041

94.4

952

281

305

86.1

988.7

931

1,690

872

1958
1959
1960
1961

i'""'

(4)

CO-OPEP....t,.TIOIJ IN CROPS
ied on Privat e Fa:r:ms by GAC Machin ery
erfor;::
Work I

thJ:i.Jber

Co·-op
Members .Q.I

(3)

1962

1963

1964
1965
1966
1967

1,437

1,520

n.a.

O

[Conti nued]

